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We present evidence that the level of ¯nancial development in FDI recipient countries system-
atically a®ects the spatial distribution of multinational corporations' (MNCs) sales. Using detailed
proprietary survey data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on US multinational
activity abroad, we ¯nd that stronger ¯nancial development in the host country has a negative
e®ect on the share of MNC a±liate sales that remain in the host country, indicating a reduced
propensity towards horizontal FDI. Conversely, the share of a±liate sales that is re-exported to
third-country destinations increases, suggesting an increased propensity towards export-platform
FDI. We provide a three-country model with heterogenous ¯rms that rationalizes these observa-
tions: More ¯nancially developed host countries foster entry by domestic ¯rms, making the local
market more competitive for MNC products. This leads MNCs to orient their a±liates away from
servicing the local market towards third-country markets instead.
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11 Introduction
The international organization of production has been growing, not just in scale, but also in complexity
in recent decades. Multinational corporations (MNCs) now face a rich set of options with regards to
how to arrange and organize their production processes to serve di®erent markets. MNCs can choose
to set up full-°edged production facilities in foreign countries, with the primary intention of selling the
output directly to these local markets. This strategy of horizontal FDI is particularly attractive when
the transport cost of shipping ¯nal goods to these markets is high, and when the loss of plant-level
scale economies is minimal; the familiar proximity-concentration tradeo® would then favor horizontal
FDI over exporting as the main method of servicing these markets.1 On the other hand, vertical FDI
arises when ¯rms locate production stages abroad primarily to take advantage of lower factor prices.
Such cross-border fragmentation of the production line is more likely when factor price di®erences
across countries are large, and when the cost of shipping components is low.2 While the literature has
traditionally stressed the di®erence between these horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI, recent
trends (highlighted, for example, by Hanson et al. (2001) and Ekholm et al. (2003)) have pointed
out that reality does not conform to this neat dichotomy. In practice, FDI often takes place for a
hybrid purpose, both to tap into lower host country wages, and to provide a base for servicing large
third-country markets, a phenomenon termed export-platform FDI.
Table 1 illustrates how each of these three motives for FDI { horizontal, vertical, and export-
platform { is manifest in the data on MNC activity. This Table provides a breakdown of US foreign
a±liate sales by sales destination, based on data collected from all US multinationals by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA).3 (A detailed discussion of this dataset is deferred to Section 4.) Focusing
on the ¯rst three rows of information, note that the typical a±liate channels the bulk of its sales (about
70%) to the local host country market, a±rming the importance of horizontal FDI. This nevertheless
leaves a substantial share to sales to third-country markets as well as back to the US, which speaks
1See, for example, Markusen (1984), and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000), for formal treatments of this proximity-
concentration tradeo®. Another common prediction of these models is that horizontal FDI is more likely the more similar
the parent and the foreign countries are in their market size and factor endowment mix, the intuition being that this
facilitates setting up a replicate of the production plant in the host country. With regards to empirical evidence, Brainard
(1997) con¯rms that higher trade costs and lower plant-level scale economies are associated with an increase in MNC
sales relative to exporting. Helpman et al. (2004) further show that industries characterized by a high degree of ¯rm
heterogeneity in productivity levels have higher levels of MNC sales relative to exports.
2Helpman (1984) builds a model within the Heckscher-Ohlin paradigm to explain how multinational activity can
emerge between two countries that di®er in their relative factor endowment mix. On the growing relevance of vertical
FDI, Hummels et al. (2001) and Hanson et al. (2001, 2005) document the rise of vertical production networks, as
evidenced by the increase in US parent ¯rm shipments of intermediate goods to overseas a±liates for further assembly
or processing, particularly to host countries where unskilled wages and trade costs are lower. Separately, Yeaple (2003b)
con¯rms that skill endowments matter for FDI, by showing that total US foreign a±liate sales at the country-industry
level depend positively on host-country skill abundance interacted with a measure of industry skill intensity.
3Our use here of a±liate sales data echoes the view in Lipsey (2003) that such micro data provide a more direct and
meaningful measure of MNC production and activity than ¯gures derived from national income accounts.
2to the relevance of the export-platform and vertical motives respectively behind FDI.4
In this paper, we explore how conditions in the FDI recipient country in°uence the nature and
composition of MNC activity. We focus speci¯cally on the role played by the level of ¯nancial devel-
opment in the FDI host, a key country characteristic that speaks to the ease with which prospective
local businesses can obtain secure sources of private credit to fund entry or investment.5 Using the
BEA data on US multinational activity abroad, we ¯nd that US a±liates operating in countries with
more mature levels of ¯nancial development (as measured by a higher private credit to GDP ratio)
tend to channel a smaller share of their total sales to the local host country market. We interpret this
accordingly as a decreased propensity towards horizontal FDI. Conversely, better host country ¯nan-
cial development is associated with a higher share of sales to third-country markets, which we view as
an increased propensity towards export-platform FDI. We generally also ¯nd a smaller positive e®ect
on the share of return sales to the US market, although this last e®ect is not statistically signi¯cant.
These empirical patterns are present in the spatial distribution of individual a±liate sales, as well as
in the data aggregated to the country level.
To rationalize these observations regarding the e®ects of the host country credit environment on
the destination of MNC sales, we develop a trade model with heterogenous ¯rms along the lines of
Melitz (2003) and Grossman et al. (2006). There are three countries in our model, in order to provide
an export-platform motive for FDI: The North comprises two identical large economies (which we
call \West" and \East"), while production costs are lower in the third country (\South").6 In the
di®erentiated goods industry (\manufacturing"), ¯rms are heterogenous in their productivity levels.
We consider the decision problem of a manufacturing ¯rm from West; the situation for ¯rms in East is
entirely symmetric. The productivity draw that the Western ¯rm obtains determines which markets
the ¯rm can enter, as well as the mode (exports or FDI) for servicing each market. Exporting incurs
an iceberg transport cost, but requires a lower ¯xed cost than FDI. If on the other hand the Western
¯rm chooses to locate production in South, it stands to bene¯t from the lower wage costs in that
country. In our analysis, we will focus on a situation in which it is only the most productive Western
¯rms that can overcome the high ¯xed cost of FDI in South, and subsequently use that Southern
plant as a global production center for servicing all three markets.
4The share of a±liate sales to the US market serves as a proxy for vertical FDI, in the sense that production has been
fragmented with headquarter services provided in the MNC's home country, while physical production and assembly are
conducted in the FDI host country.
5See Navaretti and Venables (2004, Chapter 6) and Blonigen (2005) for a review of the broader literature on other
country characteristics that a®ect FDI. See also B¶ enassy-Qu¶ er¶ e et al. (2005), who ¯nd evidence that strong host country
institutions, such as secure property rights enforcement and the lack of corruption, have a positive impact on FDI. (Their
study uses FDI stock data from the OECD, and testing is implemented using a gravity equation regression speci¯cation.)
6This three-country structure is also employed in Ekholm et al. (2003), Yeaple (2003a), and Grossman et al. (2006)
to explore the international production strategies available to MNCs when there is a large third-country market that
MNCs may wish to service.
3We introduce a need for ¯nancial intermediation by requiring that ¯rms borrow to ¯nance upfront
their ¯xed costs of production. However, credit markets are imperfect in South, so that some prospec-
tive Southern ¯rms cannot enter their own local industry due to an inability to gain access to credit,
even though their pro¯ts would be positive if they could otherwise ¯nance their ¯xed costs. We then
formally derive how shifts in the level of ¯nancial development in South will a®ect the equilibrium in
the manufacturing industry, and in particular, the activities of Western MNCs. Intuitively, an easing
of credit constraints in South facilitates entry by more Southern ¯rms into the local manufacturing
sector, so that Western ¯rms now face increased competition in the Southern market (assuming that
all manufacturing varieties are substitutes in consumption). As a consequence, this induces West-
ern MNCs located in South to channel their sales away from the local market, towards servicing the
third-country and home markets instead. This competition e®ect thus generates shifts in a±liate sales
destinations that match our main empirical ¯ndings, namely an increase in the share of platform sales
to other countries and a decrease in the share of horizontal sales to the local market. Our model also
predicts a larger increase in the share of third-country sales than in the share of sales back to the
home country, since Western MNCs face an additional margin of competition in their home market
from purely domestic ¯rms (Western ¯rms that only serve their domestic economy). This dovetails
with our empirical ¯nding of a smaller impact of host country ¯nancial development on vertical sales
to home than on platform sales to other countries.
Our paper adds to an active and extensive literature on the role of ¯nancial development in
economic growth and trade. Empirical work at the cross-country level has shown that ¯nancial devel-
opment plays an important role in raising growth rates in sectors that are inherently more dependent
on external sources for their capital ¯nancing needs (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Evidence from trade
°ows has also con¯rmed that a more mature credit environment tends to boost manufacturing ex-
ports (Beck 2002), as well as to promote specialization in industries that are more dependent on
external ¯nance (Beck 2003, Manova 2006).7 With regards more speci¯cally to FDI, Alfaro et al.
(2004) show that FDI in°ows boost economic growth signi¯cantly for host countries that have strong
levels of ¯nancial development; this relationship between FDI and growth is otherwise nondescript if
the mediating role of ¯nancial development is not taken into account.
Our paper also falls within a body of work that seeks to model the complex FDI strategies that
MNCs adopt in a world with multiple markets. Ekholm et al. (2003) show how export-platform FDI
7Manova (2006) further decomposes this e®ect of credit constraints into the shares that act on the intensive and
extensive margins of trade respectively. On a related note, Becker and Greenberg (2005) show that countries with more
mature levels of ¯nancial development exhibit greater export volumes in high ¯xed cost industries. See also Wynne
(2005) who advances the idea that wealthier countries have a comparative advantage in credit-constrained industries.
For theoretical work on how credit constraints in°uence the pattern of trade, see Matsuyama (2005).
4can emerge as the mode for servicing a large third-country market when wage costs in South, the
shipping cost for components, and the ¯xed cost of setting up an additional plant are all low. They
discuss how a free trade agreement between South and the third-country market can encourage more
export-platform FDI, as transport costs from the FDI host market to the ¯nal sales destination are
lowered.8 Separately, Yeaple (2003) and Grossman et al. (2006) emphasize the role of various com-
plementarities in the production and transport cost parameters faced by MNCs in determining their
optimal cross-border integration strategies. For example, moving one stage of production to South
lowers unit costs and raises total output, thereby creating an added incentive to locate other stages of
production in South as well to bene¯t from the lower costs there. Our modelling approach resembles
most that of Grossman et al. (2006), in that we incorporate ¯rm heterogeneity in productivity levels.
That said, our primary goal here is not to characterize the full range of organizational forms that can
emerge, but to analyze instead how conditions (speci¯cally, ¯nancial development) in the FDI host
country impact the sales activities of MNCs who locate their production there.
In this regard, the e®ect of host country ¯nancial development on MNCs has received a fair
amount of attention, with most prior work focusing on the in°uence of the local credit environment
on the capital ¯nancing decisions of MNC a±liates. Feinberg and Phillips (2004) identify how a
poorly developed capital market in the host country places limits on the expansion prospects of US
a±liates. While internal ¯nancing from the US parent does provide an alternative source of funding
(Desai et al. 2004), this appears for the typical a±liate to be insu±cient to entirely remove credit
constraints in some host countries.9 Adopting a principal-agent perspective on the role of US parent
companies, Antrµ as et al. (2007) develop a framework in which ¯nanciers in the host country require the
participation of a US parent to ensure monitoring of local a±liates. In countries with weak ¯nancial
development, the regulatory system is unable to adequately protect these local ¯nanciers, prompting
them to require US parents to take larger direct investment stakes in the local a±liate, as opposed to
arms-length licensing arrangements.
We move away in this paper from this issue of the sources of MNC a±liate ¯nancing. Our
model simpli¯es the ¯nancing decision by assuming that Northern ¯rms can access external capital
at a ¯xed world interest rate and need not rely on Southern credit markets. While this is done for
convenience, all that is necessary for our story is that Southern ¯rms are more burdened than Northern
¯rms by poor access to credit. Instead, we turn our attention to how improvements in host country
¯nancial development also promotes entry of local (Southern) ¯rms. This increases the level of market
8Export-platform FDI also depends on accessibility to third-country markets: Gao and Yu (2005) show that platform
sales are increasing in a measure of the host country's market access to the rest of the world.
9Constantini (2006) shows that weak ¯nancial development is particularly detrimental to smaller ¯rms, and tends to
skew the distribution of ¯rm sizes even more towards large ¯rms.
5competition in the Southern market, which induces Northern MNCs to shift their a±liate sales away
from servicing the host country market.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the three-country model with heterogenous ¯rms.
Section 3 derives the comparative statics regarding the e®ect of host country ¯nancial development
on the spatial distribution of MNC a±liate sales. Section 4 presents the empirical results, using both
¯rm-level and aggregate data on US multinational activity abroad. Section 5 concludes. Detailed
proofs of the theoretical results are in the Appendix (Section 7).
2 Credit Constraints in a Model with Heterogenous Firms
We develop a three-country model with heterogenous ¯rms to analyze how conditions in the FDI host
country systematically a®ect the sales decisions of multinational a±liates based there. In particular,
we focus on the role of host country ¯nancial development and its e®ect on the relative propensity of
MNC a±liates to service the local market versus home or third-country markets.
In our model, the developed North consists of two identical countries (\West" and \East"). Being
mature economies, these countries are large consumer markets, but wage costs are also higher. The
remaining country is a low-wage economy (\South"), which can be thought of as a developing country.
Each of the three economies, West, East and South, is made up of two sectors: (i) a homogenous good
sector (\agriculture"), and (ii) a di®erentiated goods sector (\manufacturing"). The homogenous
good is produced using a constant returns to scale technology, and we shall assume that output in
this sector is strictly positive in equilibrium in each country.10
Labor is the sole factor of production, with the nominal wage pinned down by the constant marginal
product of labor in the respective domestic agriculture sectors. We normalize the nominal wage in
the two developed countries (West and East) to 1, and denote the wage in South by ! < 1, with
the assumption being that Southern labor is less productive in agriculture than Northern workers.11
Note that in our model, the two Northern countries, West and East, are completely identical, and
this symmetry will be important for simplifying the set of equations that describes the global industry
equilibrium in the manufacturing sector.
Utility: The utility function of a representative consumer from the developed North (subscript
10We will require that the labor force in each country be su±ciently large to ensure a positive amount of employment
and output in the homogenous good sector.
11For this factor price di®erential to be consistent with the presence of some agricultural production in all three
countries, we require either that the homogenous good be prohibitively costly to trade across borders, or that the
homogenous good be a country-speci¯c product for which there is no foreign demand.


































Utility in country i (i 2 fe;w;sg) is thus a Cobb-Douglas aggregate over consumption of the homoge-
nous good (yi) and di®erentiated varieties of manufactures, where the share of expenditure spent on
manufactures is parameterized by ¹ 2 (0;1). Here, xij(a) denotes the quantity of a country j man-
ufactured variety (indexed by a) that is consumed in country i. (As a notational rule of thumb, the
¯rst subscript identi¯es the country of consumption, while the second subscript refers to the country
of origin of the producing ¯rm.12) We de¯ne ­ij to be the set of manufactures from country j's
di®erentiated goods sector available to consumers in i. When i 6= j, this set consists of all varieties
exported from j to i, as well as varieties produced locally in i by a country j multinational a±liate
(if FDI takes place). Similarly, when i = j, ­ii is the union of all indigenous varieties produced
domestically, and all varieties produced by country i multinationals abroad that are then re-exported
back to the home market.
The sub-utility derived from manufactures is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate over consumption of va-
rieties. We stipulate that 0 < ¯ < ® < 1, which translates into a basic home-bias assumption:
Manufactured varieties from the same country are closer substitutes than two varieties drawn from
di®erent countries. While South demands varieties from all three countries, Southern varieties them-
selves do not enter the utility function for Northern consumers (see (2.1)). One could argue for
example that Southern goods do not cater to developed country tastes because they are inherently of
a poorer quality.13 That said, the key purpose of this simplifying assumption is that it allows us to
examine the Southern industry without having to worry about feedback e®ects from Northern demand
for Southern goods.
Each di®erentiated variety is produced by a separate ¯rm. Varieties are indexed by a, the per
unit output labor requirement for production of a given variety. 1=a is thus a measure of each ¯rm's
labor productivity. Upon paying the ¯xed cost of entry into the industry, each ¯rm draws its a from
a distribution Gj(a) that represents the existing slate of technological possibilities. The resulting
12In particular, xii(a) denotes country i's absorption of a variety from a country i ¯rm.
13An alternative story would be that the ¯xed costs of attempting to penetrate the Northern market are prohibitively
high, so that no Southern ¯rm can pro¯tably do so.
7productivity di®erences across ¯rms are the key dimension along which ¯rms in the manufacturing
sector are heterogeneous.
Maximizing (2.1) and (2.2) respectively subject to the standard budget constraints implies the
following familiar iso-elastic demand functions for each variety of manufactures: xij = Aijpij(a)¡",
where pij(a) denotes the corresponding price of the country j variety in country i, and " = 1
1¡® > 1
is the elasticity of substitution between di®erent varieties of manufactures from the same country.
Exploiting the symmetry between West and East, we have the following expressions for the level of
aggregate demand Aij in each country i for manufactures from j:











































­ij pij(a)1¡" dGj(a) is the ideal price index of manufactures from country j faced by
country i. Here, Ei is the total expenditure by consumers in i; in particular, Ew = Ee = En.14 These
aggregate expenditure levels are exogenous in our model, being equal to the nominal wage times the
size of the workforce in each country. Note also that Á = 1
1¡¯ > 1 is the cross-country elasticity of
substitution between manufacturing varieties. Bear in mind that ¯ < ® implies that " > Á, which is
precisely the statement that manufactured varieties from the same country are closer substitutes in
consumption than varieties drawn from di®erent countries. In particular, from (2.3) and (2.4), the fact
that Western goods are not equally substitutable for manufactures from East (" 6= Á) explains why the
demand levels for Western goods di®ers in the two developed countries, West and East (Aww 6= Aew).
As we will show below, the condition " > Á is a key condition for signing various comparative statics
related to the e®ect of Southern ¯nancial development.
2.1 Industry set-up in the Northern countries
The structure of the Northern manufacturing sector is an extension of that in Helpman et al. (2004).
We describe this industry structure for West, with the situation in East being entirely symmetric.15
14Prior three-country models, such as Ekholm et al. (2003), Yeaple (2003a), and Grossman et al. (2006), have generally
assumed that the size of the Southern market is negligible, in order to focus on the MNC's decision over how to service
the two large Northern markets. However, Southern demand for Northern manufactures plays a crucial role in our model,
in order for changes in the level of competitiveness in the Southern market to have an impact on the Northern industry
equilibrium and MNCs' behavior. Note also that it may be natural to assume that En > Es, namely that each Northern
country is a larger consumer market than South, but this will not be necessary for our results.
15The corresponding equations for East can be obtained by interchanging the subscripts `w' and `e'.
8Upon entering the industry, each ¯rm in West obtains a productivity draw, a, from the distribution
Gw(a). The ¯rm then decides whether to engage in production or to exit entirely, the latter option
being exercised if it receives a very low productivity draw. Should the ¯rm choose to stay in, production
for the home economy incurs a per-period ¯xed cost of fD units of Western labor. One can interpret
these ¯xed costs as headquarter services such as managerial expertise or recurrent investment in
maintaining equipment. At the start of each period, ¯rms require external ¯nancing to pay their ¯xed
costs upfront. For simplicity, we assume that ¯rms cannot ¯nance these out of retained earnings from
previous periods because management does not have control rights over these earnings which have to
be transferred instead as dividends or pro¯ts to the ¯rm's owners. Firms thus borrow for each period's
¯xed costs at a (gross) interest rate equal to R > 1, set exogenously by conditions in an international
capital market that we do not model explicitly.
Firms price at a constant mark-up over marginal costs, so that the home price for a Western
variety is pww(a) = a
®. Individual ¯rms take the aggregate demand levels in each market as given.
Pro¯ts from sales in the domestic market are thus equal to:





In addition, ¯rms that are su±ciently productive will contemplate exporting to East or South (or
both). Exporting to each foreign market incurs a per-period ¯xed cost of fX units of Western labor,
which would include headquarter services that go into maintaining an overseas distribution network.
At the same time, exporting incurs an iceberg transport cost that raises prices by a multiplicative factor
¿ > 1. The Western ¯rm's pro¯t functions from exporting to East and South are thus respectively:










The FDI decision: Alternatively, Northern ¯rms that are su±ciently productive can choose to
go multinational. Establishing an overseas plant confers several advantages, allowing the MNC to
move closer to its foreign markets (saving on transport costs), as well as potentially lowering its costs
should the MNC choose to locate in the low-wage South. However, setting up a production facility
abroad requires a high per-period ¯xed cost equal to fI units of Northern labor. A Western MNC
will in general face a wide array of organizational possibilities: Apart from servicing the host country
market, the Western headquarters may also want to use the foreign a±liate as an export platform to
a third country or even back to its home (Western) market. We assume that such re-exporting incurs
both the above-mentioned ¯xed cost, fX, of maintaining a distribution network per market, as well
as the same iceberg transport cost factor, ¿.
9To keep the analysis tractable (and to economize on the number of additional productivity cut-o®s
introduced), we focus on the case in which: (i) Western ¯rms that are su±ciently productive conduct
FDI only in the low-wage South and not in East (even though East may be a bigger market); and (ii)
if a Southern a±liate is established, it automatically becomes the Western ¯rm's global production
center servicing all three countries. In the discussion below, we show that two conditions, namely
¿! < 1 and fX < fD < fI, su±ce to ensure that this will be the optimal organizational mode for
Western MNCs. Intuitively, the Southern wage ! must be su±ciently lower than the Northern wage
after adjusting for transport costs, if it is to be optimal for MNCs to use South as an export platform
to all three countries. As for the latter assumption (fX < fD < fI), this re°ects the idea that the ¯xed
cost of an export distribution network is typically smaller than the ¯xed cost of running a domestic
plant, which in turn is smaller than the ¯xed cost of running an overseas production facility.
Consider then a Western ¯rm that is su±ciently productive to contemplate FDI. Observe that if
this ¯rm has established a plant in South, it is automatically more pro¯table to also use that Southern
a±liate as an export platform to East, rather than servicing East via direct exports from West or via

















which holds since ¿! < ¿, ¿! < 1 and fX < fI (bearing in mind that 1 ¡ " < 0). In particular, this
rules out the case where the MNC establishes production a±liates in both South and East.
Moreover, conditional on setting up a Southern a±liate, it is optimal to use that a±liate to service










which holds since ¿! < 1 and fX < fD. Thus, it is more pro¯table to produce in South and export
to West while shutting down home production, rather than incur the ¯xed costs and higher wages of
production at home.
It remains to check that the optimal decision for the Western MNC is to locate its overseas a±liate
in South, rather than in East. This requires that total pro¯ts from servicing all three countries out
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10Note that when FDI is undertaken in East instead, the home market (West) can be serviced either
through domestic production or re-exports from East, while South would be serviced by exports from
the developed North. The expression on the right-hand side of the above inequality captures total
pro¯ts from this alternative mode of organization. Once again, it is easy to check that this inequality
holds since: ¿! < 1, ¿ < 1, ! < ¿ and fX < fD, so that it is not optimal to conduct FDI in the
high-wage East.
In sum, the conditions ¿! < 1 and fX < fD < fI guarantee that the FDI decision is in e®ect
a decision over whether to relocate the global production center of the ¯rm to South, with only
headquarter activities being retained in West. With these parameter assumptions, and taking into
account revenues from all three markets, the pro¯t function from conducting FDI in South for a ¯rm
with productivity 1=a is therefore:








¡ R(fI + 2fX) (2.10)
Patterns of production: The productivity level of each ¯rm in West determines the markets it
is able to service and its mode of organization. Firms engage in production for the domestic Western
market if pro¯ts from (2.7) are positive. Solving ¼D(a) = 0, this pins down a zero-pro¯t cut-o® value,
aD, which is the maximum labor input coe±cient at which production for the domestic market is
sustainable. Similarly, setting ¼XN(a) = 0 yields a cut-o®, aXN, below which exporting to East is
pro¯table, while solving ¼XS(a) = 0 delivers the analogous cut-o®, aXS, for exporting to South. These












(1 ¡ ®)Asw(¿=®)1¡" (2.13)
There is a fourth cut-o®, aI, that determines when FDI becomes feasible. Focusing on the situation
where the Southern a±liate becomes the global production center for the Western ¯rm, FDI is more
pro¯table than basing production in West when: ¼I(a) > ¼D(a) + ¼XN(a) + ¼XS(a). Solving this as
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(2.14)
Note that the conditions: fI > fD, ¿! < 1, ! < 1 < ¿, and " > 1, ensure that aI > 0.





I , which describes a natural sorting of West's ¯rms to the various modes of organization.
The upper panel of Figure 1 illustrates this sorting pattern based on a1¡", which is a proxy for ¯rm
productivity levels (since 1 ¡ " < 0). The least productive ¯rms with a1¡" < a1¡"
D have labor input
requirements that are too high and exit the industry immediately upon observing their productivity
draw. Firms with productivity levels between a1¡"
D and a1¡"
XN produce only for the domestic West







Aww, so that the ¯xed cost of exporting (normalized by the level of demand in East)
must be su±ciently larger than the ¯xed cost of domestic production.16 Next, those ¯rms that are
even more productive, with a1¡"
XN < a1¡" < a1¡"
XS , are able to overcome the additional costs of exporting
to East; based on (2.12) and (2.13), this requirement that a1¡"
XN < a1¡"
XS boils down to the condition
Aew > Asw, so that the level of market demand for Western manufactures is higher in East than in
South. Firms with a1¡"
XS < a1¡" < a1¡"
I are further able to service the smaller Southern market.17
Finally, it is the most productive ¯rms with a1¡" > a1¡"
I that can successfully conduct FDI in South.
Figure 2 provides an alternative illustration of the structure of the Western industry that focuses
on the economic relations in our three-country world. Firms with a1¡" < a1¡"
I base their production
activities in West, and undertake exports to East and even to South if they are su±ciently productive
(Figure 2A). On the other hand, the most productive ¯rms with a1¡" > a1¡"
I become multinationals.
While these ¯rms are still headquartered in West, their production activities are based in South, from
which they service all three markets (Figure 2B).
2.2 Industry set-up in the FDI host country
The structure of the Southern manufacturing industry is simpler, with Southern ¯rms producing only
for domestic consumption. (Recall from (2.1) that Southern manufactures do not enter the utility
function of Northern countries.) The per-period ¯xed cost of domestic production is fS units of
Southern labor, and Southern ¯rms need to borrow at the start of each period to ¯nance these ¯xed
costs.
However, Southern ¯rms face credit constraints, arising from institutional weaknesses that lead
to imperfect protection for lenders against default risk. We model this moral hazard problem by
assuming that should a ¯rm choose to default, it would lose a fraction ´ 2 [0;1] of its revenues. Thus,
while ¯rms have a temptation to default to avoid loan repayment, this is nevertheless a costly course of
16To be completely precise, one needs to solve for the values of Aww and Aew in general equilibrium and substitute
them into this inequality for the full restriction.




I does not simplify neatly. Intuitively, it requires that
the ¯xed cost of FDI, fI, be su±ciently large so that FDI is only considered by the most productive ¯rms.
12action; the fraction ´ of revenues that is expended during default can be thought of as the pecuniary
cost of actions taken to hide the ¯rm's full ¯nancial resources from lenders. (This formulation of
¯nancial development follows, for example, Aghion et al. (2004).) Then, a Southern ¯rm with input






that is, if the revenue loss from defaulting is smaller than the cost of repaying the loan. We interpret
the parameter ´ as capturing the degree of ¯nancial development in South: Higher levels of ´ imply
that default is a more costly option because credit institutions are more developed, making it more
di±cult for ¯rms to hide their revenues and assets.
Rearranging the above default condition yields the following cut-o® level of a that determines






(1 ¡ ®)Ass(!=®)1¡" (2.15)
We assume that lenders can observe a, and hence only Southern ¯rms with a1¡" > a1¡"
S will be able
to commence production. When ´ = 1, the expression for a1¡"
S is precisely equal to the cut-o® level
for domestic entry that would prevail in the absence of credit market imperfections. The 1
´ term in
(2.15) thus raises the productivity cut-o® necessary for a Southern ¯rm to successfully enter its home
market, above the cut-o® which would su±ce in the absence of credit constraints, as illustrated in the
lower panel of Figure 1. This is because there is a margin of ¯rms with productivity levels slightly
lower than a1¡"
S that would earn positive pro¯ts, but which cannot credibly commit to repay their
loans. As ´ increases towards 1, this distortion from credit constraints vanishes.
2.3 Industry equilibrium
We now close the system formally by specifying the conditions that govern the entry of ¯rms in each
country. For this, it is convenient to introduce the notation: Vi(a) =
R a
0 ~ a1¡"dGi(~ a), as this expression
will show up repeatedly.
Free entry: Prospective entrants in country i's manufacturing sector incur an upfront entry cost
equal to fEi units of country i labor. This is a once-o® \fee" that ¯rms pay ex ante before they can
obtain their productivity draw, 1=a; for simplicity, we do not model this entry cost as subject to credit
constraints, so one can think of these as the monetary equivalent costs of regulatory hurdles to entry.18
On the exit side, ¯rms face an exogenous probability, ±, of \dying" and leaving the industry in each
18It is a straightforward extension to verify that our comparative statics results on the e®ects of host country ¯nancial
development are robust to subjecting this ¯xed cost of entry to borrowing constraints also.
13period. For an equilibrium in which the measure of ¯rms in each country is constant, this ex ante cost
of entry must be equal to the expected pro¯ts of a prospective entrant. Using the pro¯t functions
(2.7)-(2.10) and the cut-o®s (2.11)-(2.14), and integrating the expressions for expected pro¯ts over











(Vn(aD) ¡ Vn(aI)) ¡ RfD(Gn(aD) ¡ Gn(aI)) :::




(Vn(aXN) ¡ Vn(aI)) ¡ RfX(Gn(aXN) ¡ Gn(aI)):::




(Vn(aXS) ¡ Vn(aI)) ¡ RfX(Gn(aXS) ¡ Gn(aI)):::



























Last but not least, we de¯ne the measure of ¯rms in country i's manufacturing sector to be Ni,


















































The three-country equilibrium is thus de¯ned by the system of equations: (2.3)-(2.6), (2.11)-(2.21),
in the 15 unknowns, Aww, Aew, Asw, Ass, aD, aXN, aXS, aI, aS, Nn, Ns, Pww, Pew, Psw, and Pss.
While we cannot solve for all of these variables in closed form, we can nevertheless derive precise
comparative statics.
19Following Melitz (2003), for Ni to be constant in steady state, we require that the expected mass of successful entrants
be equal to the mass of ¯rms that dies exogenously in each period. Speci¯cally, letting N
ent
i denote the mass of ¯rms
that attempts entry each period into country i's manufacturing sector, then N
ent
n Gn(aD) = ±Nn and N
ent
s Gs(aS) = ±Ns
in the developed Northern countries and in South respectively.
143 Host Country Financial Development and the Industry Equilib-
rium
How does the level of ¯nancial development in the FDI host country a®ect the pattern of sales of
multinational a±liates? Within our model, this boils down to determining how changes in ´ a®ect the
spatial distribution of Western MNC a±liate sales emanating from South. We proceed now to show
how an improvement in Southern ¯nancial development systematically shifts the productivity cut-o®s
for West's manufacturing sector. To foreshadow our key results, a rise in ´ leads to an increase in both
a1¡"
XS and a1¡"
I , while at the same time decreasing a1¡"
D and a1¡"
XN. Intuitively, a stronger credit market
in South induces more entry into Southern manufactures and raises the level of competition faced in
that market by Western ¯rms. The new equilibrium thus features a smaller Western manufacturing
presence in South, and biases West's ¯rms towards solely serving the developed country markets.
To facilitate the derivations, we explicitly parameterize the set of technological possibilities in the
manufacturing sector. Speci¯cally, the productivity distribution of 1=a is set to be Pareto with shape
parameter k and support [1=¹ ai;1) for each country i. Here, 1=¹ ai is a lower bound on ¯rm productivity
in country i.20 In addition, a higher k corresponds to a thicker right-tail in the distribution of
productivity levels.21 This distributional assumption yields convenient expressions for Gi and Vi that
















Helpman et al. (2004) show that if the underlying productivity distribution is Pareto with shape
parameter k, then the distribution of observed ¯rm sales will be Pareto with shape k ¡"+1.22 Using
European ¯rm-level data, they establish the goodness of ¯t of this parametric distribution for ¯rm
sales, while always obtaining estimates of the shape parameter, k¡"+1, that are signi¯cantly greater
than 0 across manufacturing industries. This empirical evidence motivates the assumption: k > "¡1.
In essence, this requires that the distribution of ¯rm productivities places a su±ciently large mass on
high productivity levels.
20One might presume that 1=¹ as < 1=¹ an, so that the Southern manufacturing sector has a lower average productivity
level. In practice, though, we will not need this assumption for the proofs. We will however require that ¹ as and ¹ an both
be su±ciently large, so that the cut-o® values, aS, aD, aXN, aXS, and aI, all lie within the interior of the support of
the relevant distributions they are drawn from.
21It is easy to check that our proofs do not require the shape parameter k to be identical in both West and South, but
we have set k as such for simplicity.
22This distribution of ¯rm sales is equal to Vi(a) up to a multiplicative constant.
153.1 Impact on industry cut-o®s and market demand levels
We now formally demonstrate how an improvement in Southern ¯nancial development systematically
shifts the productivity cut-o®s that sort ¯rms, as well as the aggregate demand levels that these
¯rms face in each market. This bears direct implications for the spatial distribution of MNC a±liate
sales, as we will show further below. Observe ¯rst that the equilibrium in Southern manufactures is
determined solely by (2.15) and (2.17), which pins down Ass and aS. Totally di®erentiating these two
equations yields:
Lemma 1: daS
d´ > 0 and dAss
d´ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 7.1.
Intuitively, a rising cost of default in South alleviates the moral hazard problem, and hence more
Southern ¯rms gain access to ¯nancial credit. This lowers the productivity cut-o®, a1¡"
S , for entry
into the local market, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 3. However, the free-entry condition
(2.17) requires the expected pro¯tability of a Southern ¯rm to remain constant, which implies that
the average level of home demand faced by each Southern ¯rm, Ass, must subsequently fall.
Since Western manufactures are substitutes in consumption in South, these changes in Southern
¯nancial development spill over on the structure of the West's manufacturing sector. Speci¯cally, the
productivity cut-o®s and aggregate demand shifts faced by Western ¯rms are given by:





















Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
While the formal proof of Lemma 2 is fairly extended, the key shifts are very intuitive and are illus-
trated in the upper panel of Figure 3. The increase in competition in the Southern market decreases
South's demand for each Western di®erentiated variety. This lowers Asw, and correspondingly raises
the productivity bars, a1¡"
XS and a1¡"
I , for Western ¯rms seeking to penetrate South, either by export-
ing or horizontal FDI. However, since the ¯xed cost of entry, fEn, remains constant, the free-entry
condition (2.16) implies that total pro¯ts from sales in the Northern markets (West and East) must
increase. The increase in Southern ¯nancial development thus biases West's ¯rms towards serving the
developed country markets, as the productivity cut-o®s, a1¡"
D and a1¡"
XN, both fall, while the aggregate
demand levels in West and East, Aww and Aew, both rise. The parameter assumption, " > Á, plays a
subtle role that allows this intuition to run through: The output of a given Southern ¯rm must be a
16closer substitute for other Southern manufacturing varieties than are manufactures from the North,
so that Northern varieties are more easily displaced from South's consumption basket with the entry
of more competing Southern ¯rms.
Note, moreover, that the proportional shift in the a1¡"
XN cut-o® is larger than that of the a1¡"
D
cut-o®: Being closer to the a1¡"
XS and a1¡"
I cut-o®s, Western ¯rms with productivity levels around a1¡"
XN
are more directly a®ected by the contraction in Southern demand. Similarly, the a1¡"
XS cut-o® increases
proportionally more than the aI cut-o® because the most productive Western ¯rms (with a1¡" > a1¡"
I )
are insulated to some extent from the negative demand shock in the South, given that they continue to
serve the Northern markets (where demand levels have risen) while enjoying production costs savings
in the low-wage South.
3.2 The spatial distribution of sales: Firm-level predictions
These shifts in the productivity cut-o®s and market demand levels allow us to sign the impact of
Southern ¯nancial development on various sales quantities. Within our set-up, we de¯ne several
quantities of interest that describe the spatial distribution of a±liate sales. For a given a±liate in South




We shall refer to these as horizontal sales, since they allow the MNC to avoid transport costs while
servicing the Southern market. Export-platform sales to third-country destinations (East) are de¯ned
as: PLAT(a) ´ (1 ¡ ®)Aew
¡¿a!
®
¢1¡". Last but not least, sales back to the Western home market
(which we label as vertical sales) are given by: V ERT(a) ´ (1¡®)Aww
¡¿a!
®
¢1¡". These sales back to
the home market capture vertical FDI in the sense that the production process has been fragmented
across borders: Headquarter inputs, as embodied in fI, are provided in the Western headquarters,
while production and assembly occurs in South, taking advantage of lower factor costs there. Naturally,
total sales of the a±liate are: TOT(a) = HORI(a) + PLAT(a) + V ERT(a).




































which are three ratios that describe the breakdown of a±liate sales by destination.
We can now state the following result regarding the spatial distribution of MNC sales:
Proposition 1 [Firm-level predictions]: Consider a Western ¯rm with productivity 1=a, where
a1¡" > a1¡"
I , so that this ¯rm is a multinational that operates a production a±liate in South. Suppose
17that South undergoes a small improvement in ¯nancial development, after which this Western ¯rm
still remains a multinational. In response to this increase in ´:
(i) Horizontal a±liate sales to South, HORI(a), decrease, while both export-platform sales to East,
PLAT(a), and vertical sales back to West, V ERT(a), increase; and
(ii)
HORI(a)





Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
The intuition behind this proposition builds on the logic behind Lemma 2. The changes in sales
levels, HORI(a), PLAT(a), and V ERT(a), are driven by changes in the demand levels, Asw, Aew,
and Aww, in the markets that the MNC is servicing. When credit constraints in South are eased, the
demand in South for Western goods drops due to the increased competition from local ¯rms. Hence,
horizontal sales into South, as well as the share of these horizontal sales in total sales, both decline.
At the same time, demand levels in East and West rise in equilibrium, which impels the multinational
towards servicing the developed Northern markets, prompting an increase in platform and vertical
sales (both in absolute levels and in shares relative to total sales). Indeed, the model further predicts
that the increase in each MNC's export-platform sales exceeds that in its sales back to West:
Lemma 3: (i) d
d´PLAT(a) > d







Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
Platform sales increase more than vertical sales for a simple reason: The MNC faces tougher
competition in its own home market than it does in East's market, due to the presence of a margin
of purely domestic Western ¯rms (whose productivity draws satisfy a1¡" 2 (a1¡"
D ;a1¡"
XN)) that supply
close substitutes in the Western market. Once again, this e®ect depends on the assumption that
varieties from the same country are closer substitutes for one another than varieties from di®erent
countries (" > Á).
3.3 The spatial distribution of sales: Aggregate predictions
Apart from ¯rm-level predictions, our model also allows us to deduce the e®ect of host country ¯nancial
development on aggregate sales quantities. For this, we de¯ne the aggregate horizontal, platform and

















V ERT ´ Nn
Z aI
0





where we have integrated over the measure of Western ¯rms with labor input coe±cient a < aI,
that are productive enough to go multinational. (The Pareto distributional assumption for ¯rm
productivities is convenient for this purpose, as it delivers neat expressions for these aggregate sales
quantities.)
To analyze the impact of Southern ¯nancial development on aggregate sales, it is useful ¯rst to
sign the e®ect of improvements in ´ on the measure of Western ¯rms:
Lemma 4: dNn
d´ < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 7.5.
This result is very much consistent with the competition e®ect we have been highlighting: The
easing of credit constraints in South and the subsequent entry of more competitor ¯rms in the local
market reduces the ex ante expected pro¯ts of Western ¯rms. As a result, the measure of Western
¯rms also contracts.
We can now state the following proposition on the impact of Southern ¯nancial development on
aggregate sales:
Proposition 2 [Aggregate predictions]: Consider sales aggregated over all Western MNCs with
a production a±liate in South. In response to an improvement in ¯nancial development in South:
(i) HORI, PLAT, and V ERT all decrease; and
(ii) HORI
TOT decreases, while both PLAT
TOT and V ERT
TOT increase.
Proof. See Appendix 7.6.
The intuition behind part (ii) of the proposition { how the spatial distribution of aggregate a±liate
sales varies with ´ { is essentially the same as that underlying the e®ect of ´ on an individual MNC's
sales shares, as outlined in Proposition 1. An improvement in ¯nancial development in South that
increases competition in that market leads Western ¯rms to direct their sales e®ort away from South,
towards the developed Northern markets instead.
19As for part (i), observe from (3.6)-(3.8) that ´ a®ects these aggregate quantities through three
channels: (i) the productivity cut-o® for FDI, a1¡"
I ; (ii) the measure of Western ¯rms, Nn; and (iii)
the demand levels in the respective markets, Asw, Aew, and Aww. The ¯rst two channels capture the
extensive margin of sales, since these operate through the entry or exit of Western MNCs, while the
third channel re°ects the intensive margin that operates through changes in the sales of individual
MNCs. We know that the e®ect of improved Southern ¯nancial development on the extensive margin
is to unambiguously lower all three sales quantities (HORI, PLAT, and V ERT): A higher ´ raises
the productivity bar for entry into South as an MNC, so that VN(aI) drops (Lemma 2). It also
induces a contraction in the measure of Western ¯rms, so that Nn drops (Lemma 4). In the case of
horizontal sales, this negative e®ect on the extensive margin is reinforced by the simultaneous decrease
in Asw, so that HORI falls. It turns out that the decline on the extensive margin also dominates any
potential increases on the intensive margin from Aew and Aww, so that both PLAT and V ERT also
fall unambiguously.23
4 Empirical Results: Host Country Financial Development and MNC
Sales
We turn now to the supporting empirical evidence on the role that host country ¯nancial develop-
ment plays in determining the spatial distribution of MNC a±liate sales. Based on our model from
the previous section, we should expect to see that in FDI host countries with more mature credit
environments, MNC sales would be oriented away from serving the local host market, towards serving
third-country and the home country markets instead. Thus, host country ¯nancial development should
be negatively correlated with the share of local sales in total sales, while being positively correlated
with the shares of platform sales and sales to the MNC's home market. In what follows, we show that
the recent experience of US multinationals is broadly consistent with these predictions.
4.1 Data description
The information that we use on US multinational activity is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) Survey of US Direct Investment Abroad. This is a very rich dataset, including ¯nancial and
operating data of all US multinational parent ¯rms and their a±liates abroad. All foreign business
enterprises in which a US national holds at least a 10% ownership share are included in the sample,
23The dominant role of the extensive margin bears a parallel with Chaney (2005). In a model with heterogenous ¯rms,
Chaney shows that the elasticity of substitution between varieties magni¯es the impact of trade barriers on trade °ows
on the intensive margin, but dampens this relationship between distance and trade on the extensive margin. Of note,
Chaney establishes both theoretically and empirically that the e®ect on the extensive margin dominates that on the
intensive margin.
20and response to the survey is required by law. In our empirical work, we restrict ourselves to the subset
of majority-owned non-bank a±liates of non-bank US parents. While the BEA makes a fair amount
of aggregate summary statistics available on its website, the ¯rm-level data can only be accessed by
US citizens at the BEA's premises (subject to BEA approval) due to con¯dentiality reasons.
The BEA conducts benchmark surveys every ¯ve years (most recently, in 2004), which in principle
capture the entire universe of US foreign a±liate activity. In non-benchmark years, only a±liates with
sales larger than a predetermined cut-o® are required to report, resulting in a sample that is biased
towards larger ¯rms. To derive comparable summary statistics, the BEA imputes data for the smaller
¯rms in non-benchmark years. In our a±liate-level regressions, we will work with the annual data
from 1989-1998, using only those observations that the BEA micro data indicates to be original survey
information (namely, excluding all imputed data in non-benchmark years). This constrains us to an
unbalanced panel of a±liates, but our results on the impact of host country ¯nancial development
nevertheless hold when we restrict our regressions to benchmark survey years only, in which the sample
is more comprehensive.24
The BEA survey includes a question that solicits detailed information on each foreign a±liate's
\sales or gross operating revenues, excluding sales taxes". In addition to reporting total a±liate sales,
the survey requests a breakdown of these sales into: (i) local sales (in the host country market); (ii)
sales to the US; and (iii) sales to other countries. We use these as our baseline measures of horizontal
sales (HORI(a)), vertical sales (V ERT(a)) and export-platform sales (PLAT(a)) respectively. When
divided by total a±liate sales, TOT(a), these variables summarize the spatial distribution of each
MNC's sales destinations. The BEA survey further requests the breakdown within each of these three
categories into sales to other a±liates of the US reporting ¯rm and sales to una±liated customers, a
distinction which we will use later to provide alternative measures of horizontal, vertical, and platform
sales as a robustness check.
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics for each of these sales variables for the benchmark
years, 1989 and 1994. Of note, the spatial distribution patterns of US foreign a±liate sales appear to
have been fairly stable between these two benchmark years. Sales to the local host market took up by
far the largest share, being slightly over 70% of total a±liate sales in both benchmark years. Platform
sales accounted for about 20% of a±liate sales, with sales back to the US taking up just under 10%.
Turning to the right-hand variables for our regression analysis, we use Beck et al.'s (2000) data on
private credit extended by banks and other ¯nancial intermediaries, normalized by country GDP, as
24We restrict ourselves for now to the pre-1999 data, as the BEA (together with all US government agencies) switched
from the US Standard Industrial Classi¯cation (SIC) to the North American Industry Classi¯cation System (NAICS) in
1999. We have yet to fully resolve the concordance issues between these two classi¯cation systems.
21our measure of host country ¯nancial development. The availability of credit is particularly relevant
in our context, since it speaks directly to the accessibility of ¯nancial capital, and hence to the ease
of entry for host country ¯rms in their domestic market.
As additional control variables, we include both the real GDP and real GDP per capita of the
host country, taken from the Penn World Tables, Version 6.1. Real GDP serves as a control for the
host's market size, which clearly has the potential to shift the propensity of MNC a±liates to serve
the local market. On the other hand, real GDP per capita can be viewed as a proxy for local factor
costs. We also use the rule of law index from La Porta et al. (1998), as a further control for host
country conditions that could a®ect the security of inward FDI. To capture the issue of proximity and
trade costs, we use the great circle formula distance between the major population centers of the US
and each host country, taken from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales
(CEPII).25 Given the recent attention paid to the role of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in reducing
tari® barriers among member countries, we also include a set of 10 RTA dummy variables based on
Rose (2004); these are respectively equal to 1 if the host country is a signatory to the following RTAs
in the given year: EEC/EC, US-Israel, Canada-US (the precursor of NAFTA), CARICOM, PATCRA,
ANZ-CERTA, CACM, SPARTECA, ASEAN, and Mercosur.
4.2 Empirical results
We proceed to test the e®ect of host country ¯nancial development on the spatial distribution of US
foreign a±liate sales, focusing on the share of horizontal, platform and vertical sales in total sales
as our key dependent variables. We present ¯rst the a±liate-level evidence, using the BEA survey
data from 1989-1998. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 2 display the baseline regressions where the left-hand
side variable is respectively: (1) the share of sales to the local market in total a±liate sales; (2) the
share of sales to third-country markets in total sales; and (3) the share of US sales in total sales. All
regressions include year ¯xed e®ects to control for possible time trends, as well as industry ¯xed e®ects
to absorb any unobserved systematic di®erences across industries. We report robust standard errors
clustered by host country, to account for possible correlated shocks that might a®ect all a±liates in
the same country.
The e®ect of ¯nancial development identi¯ed in these regressions is consistent with the ¯rm-






TOT(a) . Column (1) con¯rms
that ceteris paribus, more mature levels of ¯nancial development are associated with a lower share
of a±liate sales to the local market (coe±cient = ¡0:106, signi¯cant at the 1% level), implying a
decreased propensity towards the horizontal motive for FDI. Conversely, the share of a±liate sales
25http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
22to third country markets increases (Column (2), coe±cient = 0:109, signi¯cant at the 1% level),
suggesting an increased propensity towards export-platform FDI. To gauge the implied quantitative
impact, consider an improvement in ¯nancial development from the 25th-percentile country (Private
credit over GDP = 0.13, in the year 1989) to the 75th-percentile country (Private credit over GDP
= 0.51). Such an increase in the availability of private credit in the FDI host country would lower
US foreign a±liates' share of local sales in total sales by 0.040 on average (from an initial mean level
of 0.716), while raising the third-country sales share by 0.041 (from an initial mean level of 0.197).
This represents a fairly sizeable re-orientation in sales destinations when viewed from the perspective
of the export-platform sales share, which would increase by about 20%.
With regards to the share of return sales to the US, although our theory predicts a positive
correlation, we estimate a coe±cient on the host's level of ¯nancial development that is statistically
indistinguishable from zero (with a negative point estimate). This evidence is nevertheless consistent
with Lemma 3, which predicts that the impact of host country ¯nancial development on platform
sales should be larger in magnitude than that on vertical sales: The coe±cient of \Private Credit
over GDP" in Column (2) is larger than that in Column (3), with the di®erence being statistically
signi¯cant at the 1% level. Although the panel that we use from 1989-1998 is unbalanced due to
BEA sampling procedures in non-benchmark years, we also ¯nd very similar results regarding the
e®ect of host country ¯nancial development on the shares of local, third-country, and US sales when
running separate regressions on each of the benchmark years, 1989 and 1994 (regressions available
upon request).
The signs we obtain on several other control variables are also consistent with the underlying intu-
ition of our model. Of note, higher levels of host country real GDP are associated with a larger share
of local sales in a±liate's total sales, as well as a smaller share of both third-country sales and sales
back to the US. We interpret this as a market size e®ect that raises the propensity towards horizontal
FDI, while steering a±liates away from servicing third-country markets or the home economy (the
US). Separately, notice that distance from the US tends to raise the local sales share. This is con-
sistent with the familiar intuition behind the proximity-concentration tradeo® that higher transport
costs (proxied here by a longer distance) make horizontal FDI a more pro¯table option for servicing
foreign markets. However, distance tends to deter US parent ¯rms from using the foreign a±liate
as a base for servicing the home market, as evidenced by the negative coe±cient (signi¯cant at the
10% level) on log distance in Column (3). While all regressions include a full set of RTA dummies,
we have displayed only the coe±cient of the EEC/EC (European Economic Community / European
Community) RTA, which is of particular interest. A by-product of the move towards European eco-
nomic integration has been the rise of several smaller European countries (most prominently, Ireland)
23as manufacturing bases from which MNCs service the large European market (Ekholm et al. 2003,
Navaretti and Venables 2004). Our regressions appear to pick up on this phenomenon, identifying a
positive and signi¯cant e®ect of EEC/EC membership on the export-platform share of a±liate sales
(with a consequent decrease in the shares of both horizontal and vertical sales).
The remainder of Table 2 explores the use of alternative measures of horizontal, platform, and
vertical sales, that draw on the distinction between sales to a±liated and una±liated customers.
Taking a±liated sales as a proxy for transactions within the boundaries of the US parent ¯rm, we
use US sales to a±liated entities as a second measure of vertical sales, to capture that component
of MNC activity that arises from the fragmentation of production processes within the ¯rm to take
advantage of cross-border factor price di®erentials. On the other hand, we use una±liated local
sales and una±liated sales to third countries as alternatives to capture horizontal and platform sales
respectively, the presumption here being that excluding intra-¯rm transactions helps provide a better
gauge of sales to consumers in each set of markets. Reassuringly, Columns (4)-(6) con¯rm that
our ¯ndings are left broadly unchanged when we adopt these alternative dependent variables. The
availability of private credit in the host country continues to have a negative and signi¯cant e®ect on
the share of sales to local una±liated customers (Column (4)). There is also a positive and signi¯cant
e®ect on the share to third-country una±liated customers (Column (5)), although the magnitude of
this coe±cient drops by about a half compared to the corresponding baseline regression in Column (2).
The point estimate for the e®ect on a±liated US sales is now positive, but this remains statistically
indistinguishable from zero (Column (6)).
Table 3 undertakes several robustness tests using the same trio of dependent variables as in our
baseline speci¯cations (Table 2, Columns (1)-(3)). One potentially important category of omitted
variables pertains to unobserved parent ¯rm characteristics. When controlling for these with parent
¯xed e®ects in Table 3, Columns (1)-(3), we continue to obtain results that are very similar to the
baseline: Once again, host countries with a better credit environment witness lower shares of local
sales, but higher shares of sales to third-countries. While the e®ect on US sales is not statistically
signi¯cant, this coe±cient is nevertheless smaller than the estimated e®ect of host country ¯nancial
development on platform sales. Columns (4)-(6) include an even more extensive set of ¯xed e®ects,
these being at the a±liate level. This subjects the data to a very stringent test (there being only at
most ten observations per a±liate in our panel), and the results we obtain are weaker, with the e®ects
of ¯nancial development being much smaller and no longer signi¯cant, although still of the predicted
sign.
How then does the data measure up when we test it against the aggregate predictions of our
model? Table 4 presents the results obtained using sales quantities summed up to the country level;
24for example, the dependent variable in Column (1) is total a±liate sales in the host's market divided
by these a±liates' total sales to all markets. We include only the two benchmark years (1989 and 1994)
in these regressions, given the concerns we have mentioned over the reliability of deduced aggregates
for non-benchmark years. Our speci¯cations again include year ¯xed e®ects, with standard errors
clustered by host country.
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 4 con¯rm that the e®ects of host country ¯nancial development are
also manifest in the aggregate data. This is despite the much smaller number of observations in
these regressions, as well as the fact that we are also controlling for both real GDP and real GDP
per capita, which are already highly correlated with ¯nancial development.26 In particular, we ¯nd
that \Private Credit over GDP" exerts a negative e®ect on the aggregate share of horizontal sales
(coe±cient = ¡0:499, signi¯cant at the 1% level), while tending to raise that of third-country platform
sales (coe±cient = 0:270, signi¯cant at the 5% level). As with the a±liate-level evidence, we do not
¯nd a signi¯cant e®ect on the share of sales returning to the US; the point estimate remains positive
and smaller in magnitude than the corresponding e®ect in Column (2) on third-country sales (although
the di®erence in these two coe±cients is now not statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels, due to
the larger standard errors obtained in these country-level regressions). Note also that the EEC/EC
dummy behaves as before, with membership in this common market tending to raise the propensity
for platform FDI, with the share of horizontal sales falling as a consequence. The results are slightly
weaker when we adopt the alternative sales measures in Columns (4)-(6) as our dependent variables:
We still ¯nd a negative e®ect of host country ¯nancial development on horizontal FDI, as measured by
the share of sales to una±liated local customers. The e®ects on both the share of una±liated third-
country sales and the share of a±liated US sales are positive, though not statistically signi¯cant.
In sum, the recent experience of US multinationals con¯rms that in host countries where private
credit is more readily available, MNC a±liates are oriented less towards sales to the local market, and
more towards using the foreign plant as a base for sales to other markets. This provides supporting
evidence consistent with the competition e®ect highlighted in our model, that a more competitive host
market decreases the propensity towards horizontal FDI, and raises that towards export-platform FDI
and (to a lesser extent) vertical FDI.
26The partial correlation between \Private Credit over GDP" and log real GDP in 1989 for the countries in our
aggregate data is 0.33 (signi¯cant at the 5% level). The corresponding correlation between \Private Credit over GDP"
and log real GDP per capita in 1989 is 0.67 (signi¯cant at the 1% level).
255 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the growing literature examining how conditions in FDI host countries a®ect
the structure of multinational activity. We uncover several novel e®ects of ¯nancial development in the
FDI-receiving country, using comprehensive a±liate-level data on US multinational activity abroad.
In host countries where secure sources of external credit are more readily accessed, MNC a±liates
exhibit a lower share of sales to the local market, while channelling a larger share towards sales to third-
country markets. Better host country ¯nancial development thus appears to reduce the horizontal
component of FDI, while raising the export-platform motive for going multinational.
We posit and formalize a competition e®ect to explain this link between ¯nancial development
and the spatial distribution of MNC sales. An improvement in credit conditions in the FDI host
country (\South") would facilitate the entry of more Southern manufacturing ¯rms into the local
market. Northern varieties thus face more competition in the Southern market, and this prompts
Northern MNCs based in South to shift their sales away from the local market, and channel them
towards the third-country and parent country markets instead. In highlighting this mechanism, we
have abstracted from the potential in°uence of host country credit markets on the capital structure of
Northern a±liates. These e®ects on the ¯nancing decisions of MNC a±liates are clearly important, and
have indeed been the focus of prior work (Feinberg and Phillips 2004, Antrµ as et al. 2007). Nevertheless,
we hope this paper will call attention to the role of Southern ¯nancial development in providing credit
access to Southern ¯rms as well, which in turn can impact the sales decisions and activities of Northern
MNCs.
There remains much scope for research which we hope to pursue in future work. While we have
focused here exclusively on MNC activity, we hope to explore how host country ¯nancial development
might also a®ect decisions regarding whether to service the host country market via exports or FDI,
as well as whether to service the third-country market via direct exports from the home country or
export-platform FDI. It would also be interesting to empirically distinguish between the e®ects of host
country ¯nancial development on the intensive and extensive margins of MNC sales.
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287 Appendix (Details of Proofs)
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1



















Note that the expression for the cut-o®, a1¡"
S , from (2.15) has been used in deriving the second

































s(aS) = (1 ¡ ´)G0
s(aS) > 0
for all ´ 2 (0;1), since a"¡1
S V 0
s(aS) = G0
s(aS) by applying Liebnitz's rule to the de¯nition of Vs(¢), and
G0
s(a) > 0 for all a 2 (0;¹ as).
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The proof of this lemma is long, so it is useful to provide a heuristic description of how this
proof proceeds. In essence, we will take the remaining 13 equations that de¯ne the Western industry
equilibrium { (2.3)-(2.6), (2.11)-(2.14), (2.18)-(2.21), and (2.16) { and log-di®erentiate them. We then





aI . From this, we can pinpoint the comparative statics with respect to ´ for the Western industry
cut-o®s, and hence for the other endogenous variables as well.






















Since " > 1, this implies that: sign(daD
d´ ) = sign(dAww
d´ ), sign(daXN
d´ ) = sign(dAew


























































Aew , and dAsw




























































































Observe that: ½1;½2;¢1;¢2;¢3 2 (0;1). Moreover, using the above de¯nitions of ¢1, ¢2, and ¢3,
one can show that:
signf¢1 ¡ ¢2g = signf((¿!)1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aD) ¡ ¿1¡"((¿!)1¡" ¡ 1)VN(aXN)g > 0
This inequality follows from the following facts: VN(aD) > VN(aXN) > 0 (since aD > aXN), and
(¿!)1¡" ¡ ¿1¡" > ¿1¡"((¿!)1¡" ¡ 1) > 0. In an analogous fashion, we have:
signf¢2 ¡ ¢3g = signf¿1¡"(!1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aXN) ¡ ¿1¡"((¿!)1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aXS)g > 0
This last expression is again positive since: VN(aXN) > VN(aXS) > 0 (because aXN > aXS), and
!1¡" ¡¿1¡" > (¿!)1¡" ¡¿1¡" > 0. It therefore follows that 1 > ¢1 > ¢2 > ¢3 > 0. These are useful
properties to bear in mind in the algebra that follows.













































































































































Focus ¯rst on the term involving daD on the right-hand side. By substituting the expression for aD
from (2.11), and applying the fact that a"¡1V 0
n(a) = G0
n(a) for all a 2 (0;¹ an), one can show that the
coe±cient of daD reduces to 0. An analogous argument implies that the coe±cients of daXN, daXS,
and daI are all identically equal to 0. Turning to the terms involving dAww
Aww , dAew
Aew , and dAsw
Asw , one can




























where the last line follows from a quick substitution from (7.1)-(7.3). Intuitively, the free-entry
condition requires that a rise in demand in any one market for the Western MNC's goods must be
balanced by a decline in demand from at least one other market. By implication, the three cut-o®s
aD, aXN and aXS cannot all move in the same direction.









































































































































where we have applied the fact that:
aVn(a)
V 0
n(a) = k ¡ " + 1, for the Pareto distribution to obtain these
last three equations.27
































































We now plug this expression for dNn









from (7.16) into (7.11) and (7.12). Finally, replacing dAww
Aww and
dAew
Aew with the equivalent expressions in terms of daD
aD and daXN
aXN from (7.1) and (7.2) respectively, one
obtains (after some re-arrangement):
¡
½2








































































































aXS , and daI
aI . To pin down the comparative statics explicitly, note that subtracting (7.22) from
27Note that we have not explicitly di®erentiated (2.21) for P
1¡"
ss . This equation only plays a role in pinning down the
sign of
dNs


































aD + (1 ¡ ½1)(¢3 ¡ ¢2)daXN
aXN










En(1 ¡ ¢3), which is the
denominator in (7.24). Note that ¢d > 0, since ½1;½2;¢1;¢2;¢3 2 (0;1).
Then, setting (7.23) equal to (7.24) and re-arranging, one obtains:
0 =
·
























Since ¢1 ¡ ¢2;¢2 ¡ ¢3;¢d > 0 and ½1 2 (0;1), it follows that the coe±cient of daD
aD in (7.25) is
negative. Moreover, using the de¯nition of ¢d, it is easy to see that the coe±cient of daXN
aXN is strictly
greater than: ¡(1 ¡ ½1)(¢2 ¡ ¢3)(¢1 ¡ ¢2) + (1 ¡ ½1)(1 ¡ ¢2)¢2, which in turn is positive, since:
1 ¡ ¢2 > ¢1 ¡ ¢2, and ¢2 > ¢2 ¡ ¢3. Thus, the coe±cient of daXN
aXN in (7.25) is positive. Since the
linear combination in (7.25) is equal to 0, it follows that sign(daXN
d´ ) = sign(daD
d´ ).
We require one more equation in daD
aD and daXN
aXN in order to pin down their common sign. For this,
substitute the expression for daI
aI from (7.24) and the expression for daXS











































































(1 ¡ ½1)(¢2 ¡ ¢3)
¢d
:::









Note that (¢1 ¡ ¢3) ¡ (¢1 ¡ ¢2)(1 ¡ ½1)
1¡Á
1¡" > 0, since: ¢1 ¡ ¢2 < ¢1 ¡ ¢3; 1 ¡ ½1 2 (0;1); and
1¡Á
1¡" 2 (0;1) (because " > Á > 1). It is then straightforward to see that both the coe±cients of daD
aD
33and daXN
aXN in (7.26) are negative. From Lemma 1, dAss
d´ < 0, so that the left-hand side of (7.26) is
negative. It follows that sign(daXN
d´ ) = sign(daD
d´ ) > 0.




















It is easy to verify that the numerator of (7.27) is smaller than its denominator; in particular, this
follows as a consequence of ¢d > 0 and ¢1 > ¢2. Since we have just shown that daD
d´ and daXN
d´ are












d´ > 0, as claimed
by part (i) of Lemma 2.
Part (iii) of the lemma follows immediately from (7.11) and (7.12), since the percentage changes
in aD and aXN are respectively proportional to the percentage changes in Aww and Aew (with multi-
plicative factor equal to " ¡ 1 > 0).

















At the same time, it is clear from (7.24) that daI



































One can now check directly that: 2
1¡½2
En
Es ¢d > 1 ¡ ¢3 > ¢1 ¡ ¢3;¢2 ¡ ¢3. The coe±cients of
daD
aD and daXN








Finally, part (iv) of the lemma follows from the fact that daXS
aXS and dAsw
Asw share the same sign (from
(7.3)).
7.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. For any given level of ¯rm productivity 1=a, the de¯nitions of HORI(a), PLAT(a), and
V ERT(a) imply that the e®ect of Southern ¯nancial development on these sales quantities is pinned
down respectively by the derivatives of Asw, Aew, and Aww with respect to ´. It follows from Lemma
2 that when Southern ¯nancial development improves, HORI(a) falls (since dAsw
d´ < 0), PLAT(a)
increases (since dAew
d´ > 0), and V ERT(a) increases (since dAww
d´ > 0).
34Moreover, (3.3) implies that the share of horizontal sales in total a±liate sales,
HORI(a)
TOT(a) , falls
when ¯nancial development in South improves, since both Aww
Asw and Aew
Asw increase with ´. On the
other hand, both Asw
Aew and Aww
Aew are decreasing in ´. (That d
d´
Aww











It remains to show that d
d´
V ERT(a)
TOT(a) > 0 as well, by far the trickiest of these comparative statics
to sign. For this, it su±ces to show that ¿"¡1 Asw
Aww + Aew
































































where `/' denotes equality up to a positive multiplicative term. (In the last step above, we have used
(7.1)-(7.3) to replace the derivatives of the aggregate demand levels with the derivatives of the industry
cut-o®s.) We now replace daXS
d´ using the expression in (7.28). Also, recalling the de¯nitions from









. Performing these substitutions













































In this last equation, the coe±cient of 1
aD
daD




d´ , using the expressions for P1¡"
ew and P1¡"





= 1 ¡ ¿"¡1
·
¿1¡"VN(aXN) + ((¿!)1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aI)
¿1¡"VN(aXS) + (!1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aI)
¸
=
¿1¡"(VN(aXS) ¡ VN(aI)) ¡ (VN(aXN) ¡ VN(aI))
¿1¡"VN(aXS) + (!1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aI)
<
(¿1¡" ¡ 1)(VN(aXN) ¡ VN(aI))
¿1¡"VN(aXS) + (!1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aI)
< 0
The second-to-last step relies on the fact that VN(aXN) > VN(aXS) (since aXN > aXS), while the last
step follows from the parameter condition ¿ > 1. The coe±cient of 1
aXN
daXN
d´ is thus negative. Since
daD
d´ ; daXN











357.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. For (i), based on the de¯nition of PLAT(a) and V ERT(a), we have:
d
d´




























where we have used (7.1) and (7.2) in substituting for the derivatives of the demand levels with respect
to ´.





VN(aD) + ((¿!)1¡" ¡ 1)VN(aI)





[VN(aD) + ((¿!)1¡" ¡ 1)VN(aI)] ¡ [¿1¡"VN(aXN) + ((¿!)1¡" ¡ ¿1¡")VN(aI)]
= (VN(aD) ¡ VN(aI)) ¡ ¿1¡"(VN(aXN) ¡ VN(aI))
> (VN(aXN) ¡ VN(aI)) ¡ ¿1¡"(VN(aXN) ¡ VN(aI))
> 0
where the second-to-last step above uses the fact that VN(aD) > VN(aXN) (since aD > aXN), while
the last step relies on the condition: 1 > ¿1¡" > 0. Thus, the fraction in square brackets in (7.30) is
greater than 1. Since
"¡Á




























d´ from Lemma 2. This establishes part (i) of Lemma 3.
























































































d´ > 0 > 1
Asw
dAsw
d´ (from Lemma 2), and
Aew
Aww > 1 (as shown above for part (i) of this lemma). Thus, in response to a given change in ´,
platform sales as a share of total sales increase by a larger magnitude than vertical sales as a share of
total sales.
7.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. To show that dNn
d´ < 0, we solve for dNn















































d´ > 0 by Lemma 2, and
" > Á > 1.) Substituting from (7.31) into (7.16), replacing daI
aI with the expression from (7.23), and
re-arranging yields:
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To determine the sign of dNn
Nn , divide the right-hand side of (7.32) by daXN
aXN , and substitute in the
expression for daD
aD =daXN
dXN from (7.27). After simplifying and collecting terms extensively, one can show
that dNn




















k ¡ " + 1
1 ¡ Á
" ¡ Á
(¢1 ¡ ¢2)[½1(¢1 ¡ ¢3) + (1 ¡ ½1)(¢2 ¡ ¢3) + ¢d]:::




k ¡ " + 1
￿




k ¡ " + 1
￿























k ¡ " + 1
1 ¡ Á
" ¡ Á
(¢1 ¡ ¢2)(1 ¡ ¢3):::




k ¡ " + 1
￿




k ¡ " + 1
￿
(1 ¡ ½1)(¢2 ¡ ¢3)
￿
(7.33)
where the inequality comes from applying: ¢d > ½1(1 ¡ ¢1) + (1 ¡ ½1)(1 ¡ ¢2) and simplifying.
We now collect all the terms in (7.33) in which "¡1
k¡"+1 does not appear:
37¡¢2[(½1(1 ¡ ¢1) + (1 ¡ ½1)(1 ¡ ¢2))¢1 + ½1(¢1 ¡ ¢2)(¢1 ¡ ¢3):::
::: + (1 ¡ ¢2)[¢2½1(¢1 ¡ ¢3) + ¢1(1 ¡ ½1)(¢2 ¡ ¢3)]
= ¡½1¢2¢3(1 ¡ ¢1) ¡ (1 ¡ ½1)¢1¢3(1 ¡ ¢2)
< 0
This term is negative, since ½1;¢1;¢2;¢3 2 (0;1).




k ¡ " + 1
￿








+ ½1(¢1 ¡ ¢2)(¢1 ¡ ¢3):::







½1(¢1 ¡ ¢2)(1 ¡ ¢3) ¡
" ¡ 1
" ¡ Á




k ¡ " + 1
h
(½1(1 ¡ ¢1) + (1 ¡ ½1)(1 ¡ ¢2))¢1 + ½1(¢1 ¡ ¢2)(¢1 ¡ ¢3):::







½1(¢1 ¡ ¢2)(1 ¡ ¢3) ¡
" ¡ 1
" ¡ Á




k ¡ " + 1
￿
½1(1 ¡ ¢1)¢2 + (1 ¡ ½1)¢1(1 ¡ ¢2) +
" ¡ 1
" ¡ Á




k¡"+1 > 0. We have thus successfully veri¯ed that dNn
d´ < 0, so an improvement in ¯nancial
development in South leads to a contraction in the measure of Western ¯rms.
It is worth noting that a proof analogous to that presented here can be used to show that
d(NnAww)
d´ < 0. Likewise,
d(NnAsw)
d´ < 0 since both Nn and Asw are decreasing in ´. However, the
sign of
d(NnAew)
d´ cannot be pinned down explicitly. Recall that Lemma 2 states that in response to
an increase in ´, the proportional increase in Aew is larger than that of Aww. It turns out that this
larger increase in Aew may more than outweigh the decline in Nn, so that the overall e®ect on NnAew
is indeterminate.
7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Since Vn(a) is an increasing function for all a 2 (0;¹ an), an improvement in ´ leads to a decrease
in aI and hence in Vn(aI) also. Lemma 4 has also established that Nn decreases in ´. Therefore, to







































































































To get from the ¯rst line above to the expression on the second line, we have used the expression
for dNn















VN(aI) = k¡"+1 for the Pareto distribution. The last step establishing that d










d´ , bearing in mind that 1 ¡ Á < 0 and k ¡ " + 1 > 0. Thus,
when ´ increases, the contraction in the extensive margin of sales captured by the fall in Nn and
VN(aI) is larger in magnitude than the increase in sales on the intensive margin due to the rise in the
demand level, Aew.
Turning to part (ii) of the proposition, note from (3.6)-(3.8) that the expressions for the aggregate
horizontal, platform and vertical shares are algebraically identical to (3.3)-(3.5), the corresponding
expressions for individual MNCs. From the proof of Proposition 1, this means that HORI
TOT falls, while
both PLAT
TOT and V ERT
TOT rise, when ´ increases.
39Table 1
Summary Statistics
(A±liate-level variables, Benchmark survey years only)
Mean Std. Dev.
Year: 1989
No. of obs. = 6248
Local / Total sales 0.716 0.348
3rd-country / Total sales 0.197 0.291
US / Total sales 0.087 0.223
Una® Local / Total sales 0.678 0.369
Una® 3rd-country / Total sales 0.117 0.227
A® US / Total sales 0.069 0.200
Year: 1994
No. of obs. = 6316
Local / Total sales 0.704 0.354
3rd-country / Total sales 0.206 0.297
US / Total sales 0.091 0.223
Una® Local / Total sales 0.660 0.377
Una® 3rd-country / Total sales 0.115 0.226
A® US / Total sales 0.071 0.200
Notes: Based on the BEA Survey of US Direct Investment Abroad.
40Table 2















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private Credit ¡0.106*** 0.109*** ¡0.002 ¡0.118*** 0.051** 0.004
over GDP (0.031) (0.024) (0.015) (0.035) (0.020) (0.015)
Log Real GDP 0.106*** ¡0.092*** ¡0.014*** 0.104*** ¡0.037*** ¡0.012***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.005) (0.019) (0.006) (0.004)
Log Real GDP ¡0.020 0.003 0.017 ¡0.029 0.010 0.011
per capita (0.043) (0.030) (0.022) (0.045) (0.024) (0.021)
Log Distance 0.081* ¡0.014 ¡0.067* 0.076 ¡0.004 ¡0.072**
(0.047) (0.018) (0.035) (0.050) (0.011) (0.033)
Rule of Law 0.004 0.005 ¡0.009 0.007 0.007 ¡0.012
(0.016) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.007) (0.008)
EEC/EC Dummy ¡0.161*** 0.194*** ¡0.033** ¡0.151*** 0.086*** ¡0.023*
(0.037) (0.032) (0.016) (0.040) (0.019) (0.013)
Number of obs. 40708 40708 40708 40708 40708 40708
R
2 0.22 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.18
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by host country, are reported in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote signi¯cance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All speci¯cations include year ¯xed e®ects, industry ¯xed e®ects, as well as
a full set of RTA dummies (only the coe±cient on the EEC/EC dummy is reported).
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Determinants of the Spatial Distribution of MNC Sales














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private Credit ¡0.107*** 0.104*** 0.004 ¡0.014 0.005 0.009
over GDP (0.028) (0.022) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.007)
Log Real GDP 0.101*** ¡0.090*** ¡0.010*** ¡0.041 0.042 0.000
(0.017) (0.015) (0.004) (0.041) (0.045) (0.035)
Log Real GDP ¡0.017 0.001 0.016 0.206*** ¡0.174*** ¡0.032
per capita (0.036) (0.027) (0.016) (0.059) (0.053) (0.057)
Log Distance 0.081** ¡0.017 ¡0.064*** 1.789*** ¡1.628*** ¡0.161
(0.031) (0.016) (0.019) (0.402) (0.410) (0.346)
Rule of Law 0.000 0.009 ¡0.009* ¡0.032 0.019 0.012
(0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.044) (0.047) (0.034)
EEC/EC Dummy ¡0.157*** 0.178*** ¡0.021* ¡0.001 0.011 ¡0.009**
(0.033) (0.030) (0.011) (0.019) (0.020) (0.005)
Number of obs. 40708 40708 40708 40708 40708 40708
Within R
2 0.16 0.23 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.01
Parent ¯xed e®ects Yes Yes Yes No No No
A±liate ¯xed e®ects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by host country, are reported in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote signi¯cance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All speci¯cations include year ¯xed e®ects, industry ¯xed e®ects, as well as
a full set of RTA dummies (only the coe±cient on the EEC/EC dummy is reported).
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Determinants of the Spatial Distribution of MNC Sales














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private Credit ¡0.499*** 0.270** 0.123 ¡0.504*** 0.150 0.107
over GDP (0.127) (0.112) (0.100) (0.130) (0.101) (0.100)
Log Real GDP 0.138*** ¡0.070** ¡0.048* 0.135*** ¡0.033 ¡0.042*
(0.036) (0.031) (0.024) (0.039) (0.020) (0.024)
Log Real GDP 0.204*** ¡0.044 ¡0.189** 0.197** ¡0.023 ¡0.191**
per capita (0.072) (0.045) (0.090) (0.076) (0.028) (0.091)
Log Distance ¡0.041 0.034 0.010 ¡0.043 0.012 0.010
(0.065) (0.039) (0.059) (0.070) (0.032) (0.056)
Rule of Law 0.005 0.003 0.025* 0.005 0.003 0.026*
(0.023) (0.017) (0.013) (0.026) (0.012) (0.013)
EEC/EC Dummy ¡0.202** 0.162** 0.013 ¡0.177* 0.003 0.023
(0.076) (0.073) (0.055) (0.092) (0.037) (0.053)
Number of obs. 61 54 58 63 59 58
R
2 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.54 0.35 0.56
Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered by host country, are reported in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote signi¯cance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All speci¯cations include year ¯xed e®ects, as well as a full set of RTA
dummies (only the coe±cient on the EEC/EC dummy is reported).
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Productivity Cut-offs and Industry Structure 
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Modes of Organization and Destination Markets 
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Modes of Organization and Destination Markets 
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 Figure 3 
Response of Productivity Cut-offs and Industry Structure to  
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